Blog

Fraud Fighters United with MITRE F3

Fraud Fighters United with MITRE F3

By Mike Cunningham, Suneel Sundar and Tiffany Bergeron • April 9, 2026

Fight Financial Fraud screenshot

Fraud actors do not operate within the boundaries of organizational charts. They move seamlessly across cyber systems and fraud channels, combining techniques to steal your money and the bank’s money. Fraud analysts see part of the activity and react. Cyber defenders see another and engage in proactive defense. If defenders remain separate, organizations struggle to connect signals, understand incidents, and prioritize defenses. That gap slows response, precludes prevention, and drives ever-increasing losses.

MITRE Fight Fraud Framework™ (F3) changes that.

MITRE F3™ is a behavior-based model of fraud actor tactics and techniques, developed by cyber and fraud analysts together and derived from real-world fraud incidents. It gives fraud and cyber defense a common structure to describe what happened, relate events, and disrupt fraud outcomes through their combined strengths.

Developed in collaboration with CTID members including A-ISAC, Citigroup, CrowdStrike, FS-ISAC, JPMorganChase, Lloyds Banking Group, Marsh, National Retail Federation, RH-ISAC, Standard Chartered, and Verizon Business, F3 reflects how fraud occurs, not how organizations are structured.

Financial fraud hurts us all. The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation reports over $50 billion in losses from more than 800,000 complaints across 2020 to 2024. And the quantity of loss increases year-over-year. Worldwide, this multiplies to $580 billion lost to fraud scams and bank fraud schemes in 2025 alone.

Internet Crime Complaint Center loss data over 2020-2024
Internet Crime Complaint Center loss data over 2020-2024

A Model Built on Real Fraud Behavior

Like MITRE ATT&CK®, F3 organizes fraudster behavior into Tactics - the why of the fraudster - and techniques - the how. However, fraud introduces behaviors that are absent in ATT&CK, such as how adversaries prepare accounts, manipulate transactions, and extract value. F3 addresses this gap by introducing two fraud-specific tactics:

  • Positioning: the adversary’s actions in a selected environment, after initial access, to collect or manipulate data or otherwise prepare for execution.
  • Monetization: the adversary’s actions to convert assets, often stolen, into usable funds or value in their possession.

These additions capture the uniqueness of fraud where success depends on moving and extracting value, not just gaining access. By capturing those stages, F3 allows defenders to trace fraud activity from initial compromise through financial impact.

Where a tactic or technique already exists in ATT&CK, F3 uses those directly. Most F3 tactics will be familiar to threat-informed defenders, though F3 modifies their definitions to the specific fraud outcomes:

  • Reconnaissance: the adversary’s actions to gather information they can use to plan future operations, including both cyber intrusions and attempted fraud.
  • Resource Development: the adversary’s actions to establish resources they can use to support both cyber and fraud activities.
  • Initial Access: the adversary’s actions to gain a foothold in a selected environment.
  • Defense Evasion: the adversary’s actions to avoid being detected.
  • Execution: the adversary’s actions to perform behaviors that directly advance the fraud operation.

This structure creates a shared language that allows cyber and fraud defenders to enumerate the material events in a fraud incident, connect cyber activity to financial outcomes, and align detection, prevention, & response strategies.

Where F3 introduces unique techniques, we extend ATT&CK’s model with F1XXX-series techniques that capture fraud-specific actions while remaining compatible with the ATT&CK schema.

Design Principles on the Bleeding Edge of Fraud

Our guiding light for F3 was simple: accurately represent how fraud actors operate, in a way that helps institutions defend against them. To do that, we adopted design principles modeled on MITRE ATT&CK and tuned them for financial fraud:

  • Institutions must see the effects of a technique during the fraud incident. If you cannot observe how an action impacts the incident, you cannot detect it, measure it, or use it to improve your strategy. Visibility into what the fraud actor does at each step is essential for evaluating effectiveness, limitations, and side effects and for shaping future fraud strategies, rules, and processes.
  • The fraud incident must contain a cyber-based technique. Every incident represented in F3 includes at least one digital or technological method, such as phishing, malware, or unauthorized access, rather than being purely physical or paper-based. This keeps F3 actionable for cyber threat intelligence, detection engineering, and security control design.
  • Techniques must describe the behavior of the adversary. Techniques represent how a fraud actor achieves a tactical goal by performing an action. They focus on distinct, observable behaviors, not on entities or tools, so that defenses, detection logic, and controls map directly to what the actor does.
  • Behaviors with the same how but performed in different ways use technique and sub-technique relationships. Not all techniques have sub-techniques, but when a single behavior appears in multiple concrete forms, we capture those variations as sub-techniques. This keeps techniques at a consistent level of abstraction, reduces overlap, and lets F3 show both the high-level behavior and its detailed variants.

These principles keep F3 tightly aligned to fraud behavior and ensure that the framework remains usable for categorizing, detecting, and preventing fraud incidents.

From Fragmentation to Fusion

Fraudsters have evolved from smash-and-grab check washers to scammers with spoofed credentials, social engineering savvy, and software manipulation. Fraud prevention requires coordination across teams that traditionally operate in silos. F3 is the universal translator that enables that coordination.

With F3:

  • Fraud analysts describe incidents using consistent behaviors
  • Cyber teams detect and validate adversary techniques
  • Security leaders assess risk based on how fraud unfolds

This shared foundation enables organizations to move from fragmented visibility to coordinated, threat-informed defense against fraud.

A Living Framework for an Evolving Problem

Fraudsters are not slowing down. New schemes will emerge, and adversaries will adapt their techniques. F3 is designed to keep pace with new techniques so that threat-informed fraud defenders can stay ahead.

The framework is a living knowledge base, continuously updated with new techniques, refinements, and community input. It reflects real-world observations and grows alongside the fraud-fusion community. As we grow F3, we will include more resources for threat-informed fraud defenders such as data sources to detect fraudster techniques and recommended mitigations to counteract them.

You can explore the framework, suggest edits to techniques, and contribute improvements on the F3 website.

Get Involved

F3 improves through community use and contribution. There are several ways to get involved:

  • Review and apply the framework. Use F3 in your environment and provide feedback on its structure, techniques, and methodology.
  • Prioritize future content. Identify fraud behaviors and scenarios that should be incorporated into future updates.
  • Contribute new techniques or refinements. Submit gaps, corrections, or examples from real-world incidents.

We welcome your input to help refine F3 and strengthen its value to the fraud and cybersecurity communities. Submit feedback or contact us directly for collaboration opportunities.


© 2026 The MITRE Corporation. Approved for Public Release. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Document number PR_25-02691-6.


About the Authors

Mike Cunningham

As R&D Program Manager in MITRE’s Center for Threat-Informed Defense, Mike is responsible for project execution and vision. He continuously advances the state of the art and the state of practice in threat-informed defense through cutting-edge research and innovation. Before joining MITRE, Mike was an Interactive On-Net Operator in Tailored Access Operations at the NSA. In his spare time, Mike cherishes quality time with his wife and three daughters. He also enjoys playing music, staying fit, and basking in the San Diego sun.

More by Mike Cunningham
Suneel Sundar

As the Director of Research & Development in the Center for Threat-Informed Defense, Suneel leads and executes the Center’s research program with MITRE engineers, private sector partners, and U.S. government organizations that makes cyber attackers’ lives difficult. Suneel teaches Iyengar yoga in San Diego and over Zoom.

More by Suneel Sundar
Tiffany Bergeron

As the Chief Mappings architect, Tiffany oversees all Center projects related to MITRE ATT&CK mappings, including the Mappings Explorer website, security platform mappings, and security control framework mappings.

More by Tiffany Bergeron

Recent Blog Posts:

Fraud Fighters United with MITRE F3

MITRE Fight Fraud Framework (F3) is a behavior-based model of fraud actor tactics and techniques that gives fraud and cyber defenders a shared …

Continue reading

Context to Confidence: The Next Phase of Ambiguous Techniques Research

MITRE CTID’s latest ambiguous techniques research turns context into confidence with minimum telemetry requirements and a confidence scoring …

Continue reading

A Threat-Informed Community is Necessary for Defense to Function

Threat-informed defense changes the game on the adversary. Threat-informed defenders read their adversaries’ playbooks and then orchestrate a …

Continue reading