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T1677 Poisoned Pipeline Execution

Adversaries may manipulate continuous integration / continuous development (CI/CD) processes by injecting malicious code into the build process. There are several mechanisms for poisoning pipelines:

  • In a <b>Direct Pipeline Execution</b> scenario, the threat actor directly modifies the CI configuration file (e.g., gitlab-ci.yml in GitLab). They may include a command to exfiltrate credentials leveraged in the build process to a remote server, or to export them as a workflow artifact.(Citation: Unit 42 Palo Alto GitHub Actions Supply Chain Attack 2025)(Citation: OWASP CICD-SEC-4)
  • In an <b>Indirect Pipeline Execution</b> scenario, the threat actor injects malicious code into files referenced by the CI configuration file. These may include makefiles, scripts, unit tests, and linters.(Citation: OWASP CICD-SEC-4)
  • In a <b>Public Pipeline Execution</b> scenario, the threat actor does not have direct access to the repository but instead creates a malicious pull request from a fork that triggers a part of the CI/CD pipeline. For example, in GitHub Actions, the pull_request_target trigger allows workflows running from forked repositories to access secrets. If this trigger is combined with an explicit pull request checkout and a location for a threat actor to insert malicious code (e.g., an npm build command), a threat actor may be able to leak pipeline credentials.(Citation: Unit 42 Palo Alto GitHub Actions Supply Chain Attack 2025)(Citation: GitHub Security Lab GitHub Actions Security 2021) Similarly, threat actors may craft pull requests with malicious inputs (such as branch names) if the build pipeline treats those inputs as trusted.(Citation: Wiz Ultralytics AI Library Hijack 2024)(Citation: Synactiv Hijacking GitHub Runners)(Citation: GitHub Security Labs GitHub Actions Security Part 2 2021) Finally, if a pipeline leverages a self-hosted runner, a threat actor may be able to execute arbitrary code on a host inside the organization’s network.(Citation: John Stawinski PyTorch Supply Chain Attack 2024)

By poisoning CI/CD pipelines, threat actors may be able to gain access to credentials, laterally move to additional hosts, or input malicious components to be shipped further down the pipeline (i.e., Supply Chain Compromise).

View in MITRE ATT&CK®

CIS Controls Mappings

Capability ID Capability Description Mapping Type ATT&CK ID ATT&CK Name Notes
CIS-16.7 Use Standard Hardening Configuration Templates for Application Infrastructure mitigates T1677 Poisoned Pipeline Execution
Comments
Use standard hardening templates for continuous integration / continuous development (CI/CD) infrastructure that block unreviewed code execution, isolate untrusted builds, restrict secret access, and prohibit unsafe pipeline triggers to help prevent adversaries from manipulating CI/CD processes.
References
    CIS-18.3 Remediate Penetration Test Findings mitigates T1677 Poisoned Pipeline Execution
    Comments
    This relationship applies when penetration testing identifies the described software configuration weakness and remediation of the finding hardens CI/CD pipeline settings by restricting unreviewed code execution, isolating runners, reducing secrets exposure, constraining triggers, and preventing user-controlled input from being implicitly trusted.
    References
    1. https://cas.docs.cisecurity.org/en/latest/source/Controls18/#183-remediate-penetration-test-findings
    CIS-6.8 Define and Maintain Role-Based Access Control mitigates T1677 Poisoned Pipeline Execution
    Comments
    Using role-based access control (RBAC) to limit write access to internal repositories and CI/CD pipeline permissions to users and services with a legitimate need can help prevent adversaries from modifying pipelines to execute malicious code.
    References
    1. https://cas.docs.cisecurity.org/en/latest/source/Controls6/#68-define-and-maintain-role-based-access-control
    CIS-4.6 Securely Manage Enterprise Assets and Software mitigates T1677 Poisoned Pipeline Execution
    Comments
    Version-controlled infrastructure and reviewed changes can prevent untrusted code or malicious Infrastructure-as-Code modifications from automatically reaching privileged deployment pipelines. Additional CI/CD isolation, branch protection, and secrets controls are required.
    References

      VERIS Mappings

      Capability ID Capability Description Mapping Type ATT&CK ID ATT&CK Name Notes
      action.hacking.variety.Other Other related-to T1677 Poisoned Pipeline Execution

      AWS Mappings

      Capability ID Capability Description Mapping Type ATT&CK ID ATT&CK Name Notes
      aws_identity_and_access_management AWS Identity and Access Management technique_scores T1677 Poisoned Pipeline Execution
      Comments
      AWS IAM trust policies can restrict which CI/CD identities and OIDC subjects may assume deployment roles, while least-privilege policies restrict the AWS actions those roles can take. These controls limit unauthorized pipeline access to cloud resources.
      References
      1. https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies.html