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T1195 Supply Chain Compromise

Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise.

Supply chain compromise can take place at any stage of the supply chain including:

  • Manipulation of development tools
  • Manipulation of a development environment
  • Manipulation of source code repositories (public or private)
  • Manipulation of source code in open-source dependencies
  • Manipulation of software update/distribution mechanisms
  • Compromised/infected system images (removable media infected at the factory)(Citation: IBM Storwize)(Citation: Schneider Electric USB Malware)
  • Replacement of legitimate software with modified versions
  • Sales of modified/counterfeit products to legitimate distributors
  • Shipment interdiction

While supply chain compromise can impact any component of hardware or software, adversaries looking to gain execution have often focused on malicious additions to legitimate software in software distribution or update channels.(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018)(Citation: Microsoft Dofoil 2018)(Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Adversaries may limit targeting to a desired victim set or distribute malicious software to a broad set of consumers but only follow up with specific victims.(Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012)(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018)(Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Popular open-source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications may also be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency.(Citation: Trendmicro NPM Compromise)

In some cases, adversaries may conduct “second-order” supply chain compromises by leveraging the access gained from an initial supply chain compromise to further compromise a software component.(Citation: Krebs 3cx overview 2023) This may allow the threat actor to spread to even more victims.

View in MITRE ATT&CK®

CIS Controls Mappings

Capability ID Capability Description Mapping Type ATT&CK ID ATT&CK Name Notes
CIS-16.5 Use Up-to-Date and Trusted Third-Party Software Components mitigates T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
Comments
Selecting and maintaining trusted software components helps prevent integration of malicious or compromised libraries, packages, and software.
References
    CIS-16.3 Perform Root Cause Analysis on Security Vulnerabilities mitigates T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
    Comments
    Application developers should exercise caution when selecting and integrating third-party libraries, using root-cause analysis of identified vulnerabilities to strengthen dependency-selection and management practices. This helps prevent supply chain compromise through vulnerable or malicious software dependencies and development tools.
    References
      CIS-6.8 Define and Maintain Role-Based Access Control mitigates T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
      Comments
      Implement role-based access control (RBAC) to ensure software and development tools run with the lowest necessary privileges to help limit an adversary’s ability to propagate or perform unauthorized actions in the event of a supply chain compromise.
      References
      1. https://cas.docs.cisecurity.org/en/latest/source/Controls6/#68-define-and-maintain-role-based-access-control
      CIS-7.3 Perform Automated Operating System Patch Management mitigates T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
      Comments
      ATT&CK mentions a patch management process should be implemented to check unused dependencies, unmaintained and/or previously vulnerable dependencies, unnecessary features, components, files, and documentation.
      References
        CIS-16.11 Leverage Vetted Modules or Services for Application Security Components mitigates T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
        Comments
        Application developers should be cautious when selecting third-party libraries to integrate into their application. Additionally, where possible, developers should lock software dependencies to specific versions rather than pulling the latest version on build.
        References
        1. https://cas.docs.cisecurity.org/en/latest/source/Controls16/#1611-leverage-vetted-modules-or-services-for-application-security-components
        CIS-16.12 Implement Code-Level Security Checks mitigates T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
        Comments
        Code-level security checks within the application lifecycle can identify vulnerable, malicious, or unexpected code and software components introduced through software supply-chain compromise. This relationship applies to software and development-chain compromise that can be detected through static, dynamic, dependency, integrity, or release-pipeline analysis.
        References
        1. https://cas.docs.cisecurity.org/en/latest/source/Controls16/#1612-implement-code-level-security-checks

        VERIS Mappings

        Capability ID Capability Description Mapping Type ATT&CK ID ATT&CK Name Notes
        action.hacking.vector.Partner Partner connection or credential. (Indicates supply chain breach.) related-to T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
        action.malware.vector.Partner Partner connection or credential. (Indicates supply chain breach.) related-to T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
        action.malware.vector.Software update Included in automated software update related-to T1195 Supply Chain Compromise

        GCP Mappings

        Capability ID Capability Description Mapping Type ATT&CK ID ATT&CK Name Notes
        assured_oss Assured Open Source Software technique_scores T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
        Comments
        Assured OSS provides Google OSS packages built with security features to help improve the security of a software supply chain, including vulnerability testing, signed provenance, and secured distribution.
        References
        1. https://cloud.google.com/security/products/assured-open-source-software
        mandiant_digital_threatmon Mandiant Digital Threat Monitoring technique_scores T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
        Comments
        Mandiant Digital Threat Monitoring continually monitors for compromised credentials and data leaks on both the open and dark web. This control may protect against credential abuse by alerting on leaked credentials. Since this control must depend on accessible sources for dumps, it does not protect against credentials that have been collected for a campaign but never posted, so the score is partial.
        References
        1. https://cloud.google.com/security/products/digital-threat-monitoring
        google_secops Google Security Operations technique_scores T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
        Comments
        Google Security Ops is able to trigger alerts based on unusual file write events by 3rd party software, specifically SolarWinds executable. This technique was scored as minimal based on low or uncertain detection coverage factor. https://github.com/chronicle/detection-rules/blob/783e0e5947774785db1c55041b70176deeca6f46/soc_prime_rules/threat_hunting/file_event/unusual_solarwinds_file_creation__via_filewrite.yaral https://github.com/chronicle/detection-rules/blob/783e0e5947774785db1c55041b70176deeca6f46/suspicious/unusual_location_svchost_write.yaral
        References
        1. https://cloud.google.com/security/products/security-operations
        2. https://cloud.google.com/chronicle/docs/secops/secops-overview
        3. https://github.com/chronicle/detection-rules

        ATT&CK Subtechniques

        Technique ID Technique Name Number of Mappings
        T1195.001 Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools 6
        T1195.003 Compromise Hardware Supply Chain 1
        T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain 7