Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop.(Citation: volexity_0day_sophos_FW) Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
In some cases, adversaries may abuse inactive accounts: for example, those belonging to individuals who are no longer part of an organization. Using these accounts may allow the adversary to evade detection, as the original account user will not be present to identify any anomalous activity taking place on their account.(Citation: CISA MFA PrintNightmare)
The overlap of permissions for local, domain, and cloud accounts across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within the enterprise.(Citation: TechNet Credential Theft)
View in MITRE ATT&CK®| Capability ID | Capability Description | Mapping Type | ATT&CK ID | ATT&CK Name | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CIS-16.3 | Perform Root Cause Analysis on Security Vulnerabilities | mitigates | T1078 | Valid Accounts |
Comments
Application developers can use root cause analysis to address code or build process practices that expose credentials to ensure that applications do not store sensitive data or credentials insecurely.
References
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| CIS-15.7 | Securely Decommission Service Providers | mitigates | T1078 | Valid Accounts |
Comments
Disabling provider user and service accounts and revoking associated credentials, tokens, and access permissions prevents residual provider identities from being abused by adversaries to access enterprise resources.
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| CIS-13.5 | Manage Access Control for Remote Access | mitigates | T1078 | Valid Accounts |
Comments
Access control policies for remote enterprise assets can evaluate device compliance before permitting access to enterprise resources. Requiring current anti-malware protection, secure configuration compliance, and current operating system and application versions can prevent valid credentials from being used from remote devices that do not meet enterprise security requirements.
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| CIS-5.2 | Use Unique Passwords | mitigates | T1078 | Valid Accounts |
Comments
Unique passwords reduce credential reuse across systems and accounts, limiting adversary use of one compromised password to pivot through valid accounts.
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| CIS-5.3 | Disable Dormant Accounts | mitigates | T1078 | Valid Accounts |
Comments
Disabling stale accounts removes valid authentication paths available to adversaries.
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| CIS-5.4 | Restrict Administrator Privileges to Dedicated Administrator Accounts | mitigates | T1078 | Valid Accounts |
Comments
Separating privileged accounts from daily-use accounts limits the privilege available if a primary account is compromised.
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| CIS-6.5 | Require MFA for Administrative Access | mitigates | T1078 | Valid Accounts |
Comments
Implement multi-factor authentication (MFA) for administrative accounts to help prevent unauthorized access, even if credentials are compromised.
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| CIS-6.2 | Establish an Access Revoking Process | mitigates | T1078 | Valid Accounts |
Comments
Disabling accounts that are no longer needed immediately upon termination, rights revocation, or role change prevents adversaries from gaining and using those accounts.
References
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| CIS-4.7 | Manage Default Accounts on Enterprise Assets and Software | mitigates | T1078 | Valid Accounts |
Comments
Default accounts are defined as built-in or factory/provider-set accounts across systems, software, and devices. Managing, changing default passwords, disabling state accounts, or otherwise hardening them through additional mechanisms directly constrains an adversary's abuse of the valid account technique.
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| CIS-4.3 | Configure Automatic Session Locking on Enterprise Assets | mitigates | T1078 | Valid Accounts |
Comments
The safeguard forces a renewed authentication checkpoint after inactivity and therefore reduces any possibility of opportunistic use of a still-authenticated user on an open unlocked enterprise asset.
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| CIS-3.3 | Configure Data Access Control Lists | mitigates | T1078 | Valid Accounts |
Comments
ACLs constrain which accounts can reach data and therefore directly reduce abuse of valid accounts and local data access for collection.
References
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| CIS-16.10 | Apply Secure Design Principles in Application Architectures | mitigates | T1078 | Valid Accounts |
Comments
Apply secure design principles to ensure that applications do not store sensitive data or credentials insecurely (e.g. plaintext credentials in code, published credentials in repositories, or credentials in public cloud storage) to help prevent adversaries from obtaining valid accounts.
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| CIS-16.12 | Implement Code-Level Security Checks | mitigates | T1078 | Valid Accounts |
Comments
Where code-level security checks scan application code, configuration, and repositories for hardcoded or otherwise insecurely stored credentials, exposed authentication material can be identified and removed before release, reducing opportunities for adversaries to obtain and abuse valid accounts.
References
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| Capability ID | Capability Description | Mapping Type | ATT&CK ID | ATT&CK Name | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| action.hacking.variety.Backdoor | Hacking action that creates a backdoor for use. | related-to | T1078 | Valid Accounts | |
| action.hacking.variety.Use of stolen creds | Use of stolen or default authentication credentials (including credential stuffing) | related-to | T1078 | Valid Accounts | |
| action.hacking.vector.Backdoor | Hacking actions taken through a backdoor. C2 is only used by malware. | related-to | T1078 | Valid Accounts |
| Capability ID | Capability Description | Mapping Type | ATT&CK ID | ATT&CK Name | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| artifact_analysis | Artifact Analysis | technique_scores | T1078 | Valid Accounts |
Comments
Artifact Analysis scans container images uploaded to Artifact Registry or Container Registry (deprecated) for vulnerabilities that could potentially be used to escalate privileges, such as default accounts with root permissions in Docker containers. Due to the medium threat protection coverage and scan results being available 48 hours after completion, this control was scored as partial.
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| mandiant_digital_threatmon | Mandiant Digital Threat Monitoring | technique_scores | T1078 | Valid Accounts |
Comments
Mandiant Digital Threat Monitoring continually monitors for compromised credentials and data leaks on both the open and dark web. This control may protect against credential abuse by alerting on leaked credentials. Since this control must depend on accessible sources for dumps, it does not protect against credentials that have been collected for a campaign but never posted, so the score is partial.
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| cloud_asset_inventory | Cloud Asset Inventory | technique_scores | T1078 | Valid Accounts |
Comments
This control may be able to detect when adversaries use valid cloud accounts to elevate privileges through manipulation of IAM or access policies. This monitoring can be fine tuned to specific assets, policies, and organizations.
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| cloud_endpoints | Cloud Endpoints | technique_scores | T1078 | Valid Accounts |
Comments
The Cloud Endpoints capability provides support for multiple authentication methods, including API keys and Google ID tokens. Implementing multi-factor authentication (MFA) across account types, including local, domain, and cloud accounts, can prevent unauthorized access even if credentials are compromised.
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| cloud_identity | Cloud Identity | technique_scores | T1078 | Valid Accounts |
Comments
This control can be used to mitigate malicious attacks of cloud accounts by implementing multi-factor authentication techniques or password policies.
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| gke_enterprise | GKE Enterprise | technique_scores | T1078 | Valid Accounts |
Comments
GKE Enterprise incorporates the Anthos Config Management feature to create and manage Kubernetes objects across multiple clusters at once. PodSecurityPolicies can be enforced to prevent Pods from using the root Linux user. Based on the medium detection coverage, this was scored as partial.
References
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| google_secops | Google Security Operations | technique_scores | T1078 | Valid Accounts |
Comments
Google Security Ops is able to trigger an alert based on RDP logons from non-private IP ranges.
This technique was scored as minimal based on low or uncertain detection coverage factor.
https://github.com/chronicle/detection-rules/blob/783e0e5947774785db1c55041b70176deeca6f46/soc_prime_rules/active_directory_security/security/remote_desktop_from_internet__via_audit.yaral
References
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| identity_and_access_management | Identity and Access Management | technique_scores | T1078 | Valid Accounts |
Comments
This control may mitigate the impact of compromised valid accounts by enabling fine-grained access policies and implementing least-privilege policies. MFA can provide protection against an adversary that obtains valid credentials by requiring the adversary to complete an additional authentication process before access is permitted.
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| identity_aware_proxy | Identity Aware Proxy | technique_scores | T1078 | Valid Accounts |
Comments
IAP applies the relevant IAM policy to check if the user is authorized to access the requested resource. If the user has the IAP-secured Web App User role on the Cloud console project where the resource exists, they're authorized to access the application. This control can mitigate against adversaries that try to obtain credentials of accounts, including cloud accounts.
References
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| identity_platform | Identity Platform | technique_scores | T1078 | Valid Accounts |
Comments
Identity Platform lets you add Google-grade authentication to your apps and services, making it easier to secure user accounts and securely managing credentials. MFA can provide protection against an adversary that obtains valid credentials by requiring the adversary to complete an additional authentication process before access is permitted.
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| policy_intelligence | Policy Intelligence | technique_scores | T1078 | Valid Accounts |
Comments
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a cloud account by gaining access through means of Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Policy Intelligence role recommendations generated by IAM Recommender help enforce least privilege principals to ensure that permission levels are properly managed.
References
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| resource_manager | Resource Manager | technique_scores | T1078 | Valid Accounts |
Comments
Adversaries may attempt to obtain credentials of existing account through privilege escalation or defense evasion. IAM audit logging in GCP can be used to determine roles and permissions, along with routinely checking user permissions to ensure only the expected users have the ability to list IAM identities or otherwise discover cloud accounts.
References
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| vpc_service_controls | VPC Service Controls | technique_scores | T1078 | Valid Accounts |
Comments
This control is able to mitigate against abuse of compromised valid accounts by restricting access from those accounts to resources contained within the VPC perimeter the account belongs to. Resources and services contained in other VPC networks also cannot be accessed by user accounts that are not within the VPC network perimeter.
References
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| Capability ID | Capability Description | Mapping Type | ATT&CK ID | ATT&CK Name | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| aws_security_hub | AWS Security Hub | technique_scores | T1078 | Valid Accounts |
Comments
AWS Security Hub detects suspicious activity by AWS accounts which could indicate valid accounts being leveraged by an adversary. AWS Security Hub provides these detections with the following managed insights.
AWS principals with suspicious access key activity Credentials that may have leaked AWS resources with unauthorized access attempts IAM users with suspicious activity
AWS Security Hub also performs checks from the AWS Foundations CIS Benchmark and PCI-DSS security standard that, if implemented, would help towards detecting the misuse of valid accounts. AWS Security Hub provides these detections with the following checks.
3.1 Ensure a log metric filter and alarm exist for unauthorized API calls 3.2 Ensure a log metric filter and alarm exist for Management Console sign-in without MFA 3.3 Ensure a log metric filter and alarm exist for usage of "root" account 3.4 Ensure a log metric filter and alarm exist for IAM policy changes 3.6 Ensure a log metric filter and alarm exist for AWS Management Console authentication failures [PCI.CW.1] A log metric filter and alarm should exist for usage of the "root" user
By monitoring the root account, activity where accounts make unauthorized API calls, and changes to IAM permissions among other things, it may be possible to detect valid accounts that are being misused and are potentially compromised.
This is scored as Minimal because it only supports a subset of the sub-techniques.
References
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| amazon_cognito | Amazon Cognito | technique_scores | T1078 | Valid Accounts |
Comments
This control provides partial protection for one of this technique's sub-techniques and a few of its procedure examples resulting in an overall Minimal protection score.
References
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| aws_config | AWS Config | technique_scores | T1078 | Valid Accounts |
Comments
This control provides significant coverage for one of this technique's sub-techniques, resulting in an overall score of Minimal.
References
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| aws_identity_and_access_management | AWS Identity and Access Management | technique_scores | T1078 | Valid Accounts |
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| aws_identity_and_access_management | AWS Identity and Access Management | technique_scores | T1078 | Valid Accounts |
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| aws_iot_device_defender | AWS IoT Device Defender | technique_scores | T1078 | Valid Accounts |
Comments
This control provides partial detection capability for one of this technique's sub-techniques and a few of its procedure examples resulting in an overall Minimal protection score.
References
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| aws_iot_device_defender | AWS IoT Device Defender | technique_scores | T1078 | Valid Accounts |
Comments
This control provides partial protection for one of this technique's sub-techniques and a few of its procedure examples resulting in an overall Minimal protection score.
References
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| amazon_guardduty | Amazon GuardDuty | technique_scores | T1078 | Valid Accounts |
Comments
GuardDuty implements a finding that flags occurrences unattended behavior from an IAM User in the Account.
PenTest:IAMUser/KaliLinux, PenTest:IAMUser/ParrotLinux, PenTest:IAMUser/PentooLinux, Policy:IAMUser/RootCredentialUsage, PrivilegeEscalation:IAMUser/AdministrativePermissions, UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/ConsoleLogin, UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/ConsoleLoginSuccess.B, UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/MaliciousIPCaller, UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/MaliciousIPCaller.Custom, UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/TorIPCaller, Policy:S3/AccountBlockPublicAccessDisabled, Policy:S3/BucketAnonymousAccessGranted, Policy:S3/BucketBlockPublicAccessDisabled, Policy:S3/BucketPublicAccessGranted, CredentialAccess:IAMUser/AnomalousBehavior, DefenseEvasion:IAMUser/AnomalousBehavior, Discovery:IAMUser/AnomalousBehavior, Exfiltration:IAMUser/AnomalousBehavior, Impact:IAMUser/AnomalousBehavior, Persistence:IAMUser/AnomalousBehavior, Recon:IAMUser/MaliciousIPCaller, Recon:IAMUser/MaliciousIPCaller.Custom, UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/InstanceCredentialExfiltration
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| aws_organizations | AWS Organizations | technique_scores | T1078 | Valid Accounts |
Comments
This control may protect against malicious use of cloud accounts but may not mitigate exploitation of local, domain, or default accounts present within deployed resources.
References
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| aws_single_sign-on | AWS Single Sign-On | technique_scores | T1078 | Valid Accounts |
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| Technique ID | Technique Name | Number of Mappings |
|---|---|---|
| T1078.001 | Default Accounts | 7 |
| T1078.002 | Domain Accounts | 10 |
| T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts | 28 |
| T1078.003 | Local Accounts | 8 |