HUNTABIL.I

THREATS TOCEDTIE

YING THE TECHNIQUE INFERENCE NE TO ENHANCE DETECTIONS





INTRO RAIMOND

- Defence @ Canva

Graphics where generated by Leonardo.Al

• CTO/CISO @ Huntabil.IT

• Previously Engineering Director - Cyber

• 15+ years in cyber defence and CTI roles

INTRODUCTI SECURIT

In a galaxy close to all of us... in a time no so distant... We are here to understand our adversaries and use our Jedi powers to predict their next moves



CTBE GALASIY



ADVERSARIES

The threats we look to do battle with on a daily basis

TECHNIQUES

How our adversaries go about their deeds, the methods they use to attack us





We the defenders, fightings against evil naydoers



TECHNIQUE T D D R D N C D DNGINE OUR JEDI Factor and a subsystem taught to understand connections between

TICSE TICS

CHALLEN GE Incomplete adversary reporting,

SOLUTIO N Make prediction gaps.

Make predictions on likely TTPs to fill in the



EXAMPLE SCENARIO 1

Reports on the compromise of a peer in our

We know actions on objective and some

other details but we don't know:

How did they get in

• what are their possible lateral movement

steps?

What detections should we have?

OBSERVED TECHNIQUES

ADD TECHNIQUE					;sv
>	T1486: Data Encrypted for Impact			>	<
>	T1566: PHISHING			>	<

↓↑ ORGANIZE = FILTER	↓ NAVIGATOR LAYER ↓ .CSV
✓ Execution	
> T1059: COMMAND AND SCRIPTING INTERPRETER	#1 +
> T1059.001: POWERSHELL	#5 +
> T1053: SCHEDULED TASK/JOB	#8 +
> T1204: USER EXECUTION	#10 +
> T1047: WINDOWS MANAGEMENT INSTRUMENTATION	#13 +



Add observed techniques

model

DDMO SCENARIO 1

Then add techniques it returns to refine the

When it makes sense, export the layer

DEMO SCENARIO 1

The heatmap shows you confidence of the techniques used

Initial Access 10 techniques	Execution 14 techniques	Persistence 20 techniques	Privilege Escalation 14 techniques	Defense Evasion 43 techniques	Credential Access 17 techniques	Discovery 32 techniques	Lateral Movement 9 techniques	Collection 17 techniques	Command and Control 17 techniques	Ext 9 t
Exploit Public-Facing	Command and Scripting	Boot or Logon Autostart	Boot or Logon Autostart	II Masquerading (0/9)	II OS Credential Dumping (0/8)	II Account Discovery (0/4)	II Remote Services (0/8)	II Input Capture (0/4)	II Web Service (0/3)	II Automated I
	(1/9)		Execution (0/14)	Process Injection (0/12)	II Input Capture (0/4)	II Application Window Discovery	Exploitation of Remote Services	Adversary-in-the-Middle (0/3)	II Proxy (0/4)	II Data Transfe
Valid Accounts (0/4)	User Execution (1/8)	Scheduled Task/Job (0/5)	Process Injection (0/12)	Valid Accounts (0/4)	II Adversary-in-the-Middle (0/3)	II Browser Information Discovery	Internal Spearphishing	Archive Collected Data (0/3)	Application Layer Protocol (0/4)	II Exfiltration (
Content Injection	Scheduled Task/Job (0/5)	II Valid Accounts (0/4)	II Scheduled Task/Job (0/5)	System Binary Proxy Execution	II Brute Force	II Cloud Infrastructure Discovery	Lateral Tool Transfer	Audio Capture	Communication Through	Protocol (0/3
Drive-by Compromise	Cloud Administration Command	Account Manipulation (0/6)	II Valid Accounts (0/4)	(0/13)					Removable Media	Exfiltration (
External Remote Services	Container Administration	BITS Jobs	Abuse Elevation Control	Indicator Removal (0/9)	Stores (015)	II Cloud Service Dashboard	Hijacking	II Automated Collection	Content Injection	Exfiltration (
Hardware Additions	Command	Boot or Logon Initialization	Mechanism (0/5)	" Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism (0/5)	Exploitation for Credential	Cloud Service Discovery	Peolication Through Removable	Browser Session Hijacking	Data Encoding	Network Me
	Deploy Container	Scripts (015)	Access Token Manipulation	Access Token Manipulation	II Access	Cloud Storage Object Discovery	Media	Clipboard Data	Data Encounig (0/2)	Exfiltration (
Phishing (2/4)	Explaitation for Client Execution	Browser Extensions	(0/5)	RITS lobe	Forced Authentication	Container and Resource Discovery	Software Deployment Tools	Data from Cloud Storage	Data Obfuscation (0/3)	II Medium (0/1
Replication Through	Exploration for client Execution	BIOWSEI EXtensions	Account Manipulation	II	Forced Authentication		Software Deployment roots	Data Holli Cloud Storage	Dynamic Resolution	II Exfiltration (
Removable Media	Inter-Process Communication	I Compromise Client Software		Build Image on Host	Forge Web Credentials (0/2)	II Debugger Evasion	Taint Shared Content	Data from Configuration		(0/4)
Supply Chain Compromise	(0/3)	Binary	- Scripts	Debugger Evasion	Modify Authentication Process	Device Driver Discovery	Use Alternate Authentication	Repository (0/2)	Encrypted Channel (0/2)	Scheduled 1
oupping on an o ompromise	Native API	Create Account	II (0/5)	beougger Erasion	inoury stational cation records		Material	Data from Information	Fallback Channels	o on a duica

CHALLENGE

The need to create realistic possible adversary profiles based on a set of TTPs

SOLUTI

TIE lets you create highly probable adversaries based on known real world attacks



TICSE





ESCANPLE SCENARIO 2

We need to simulate & creates detections for an adversary likely to steal data from a S3 bucket through stolen credentials.

TIE can help us create a likely adversary profile with TTPs

USING DORCE







BUILDING KNOVLEDG

Feed into TTPs into the rest of the Threat informed defence cycle

- Help build adversary profiles
- Improve your adversary simulations and develop
 likely adversaries to simulate



BUILDING KNOVLEDG

- What are our courses of action for these techniques
 - Help build better ATT&CK
 Flows
 - See common choke points



DETECTI I DETECTI I DETECTI

Band a comprehensive list of likely

TTP

- Build attack flows
- Look for top-N detections
- Priortise based on the clusters
- Use Summiting the Pyramid to factor in resilience

inique Inference Engine (TIE) Prediction Heatmap X

Execution

14 techniques

Cloud Administration Command

Exploitation for Client Execution

II Inter-Process Communication

Software Deployment Tools

cheduled Task/Job

Serverless Execution

Shared Modules

System Services

ser Execution

Deploy Container

Native API

command and Scripting Interpreter

Container Administration Command

Initial Access

10 techniques

ploit Public-Facing Application

Replication Through Removable Media

Supply Chain Compromise

Trusted Relationship

alid Accounts

Content Injection

Drive-by Compromise

arnal Remote Ser

Hardware Additions

Phishing (2/4)

Technique Inference Engine (TIE) Prediction Heatmap 🛛 🗙

Persistence

20 techniques

ot or Logon Autostart Execution

Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts

Compromise Client Software Binary

Create or Modify System Process

Addify Authentication Process

Event Triggered Execution

Hijack Execution Flow

nplant Internal Image

Office Application Startup

Power Settings

Pre-OS Boot

Traffic Signaling

alid Accounts

cheduled Task/Job

Server Software Component

Account Manipulation

Browser Extensions

Create Account

BITS Jobs

laver by operation X

Credential Access Privilege Escalation Defense Evasion 14 techniques 43 techniques 17 techniques Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism Adversary-in-the-Middle Account Discovery Access Token Manipulation Application Window Discovery ccess Token Manipulation BITS Jobs Credentials from Pa Browser Information Discover ccount Manipulation Build Image on Hos Exploitation for Credential Access Cloud Infrastructure Discov ot or Logon Autostart Execution Debugger Evasion Forced Authentication Cloud Service Dashboard Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts bfuscate/Decode Files or Information Forge Web Credentials Cloud Service Discovery nput Capture Deploy Container Cloud Storage Object Discovery Create or Modify System Process Modify Authentication Process Direct Volume Access Container and Resource Discovery Domain Policy Modification Domain Policy Modification Multi-Factor Authentication Debugger Evasion Escape to Host Execution Guardrails Device Driver Discovery Multi-Factor Authentication Reques Event Triggered Execution II Exploitation for Defense Evasio Domain Trust Discovery File and Directory Permissions Modification Network Sniffing File and Directory Discover lijack Execution Flov S Credential Dumping Group Policy Discovery Hide Artifacts Steal Application Access Token Log Enumeration ocess Injection Hijack Execution Flow cheduled Task/Job Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates mpair Defenses Network Share Discovery /alid Accounts Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets npersonation Network Sniffing Steal Web Session Cookie Indicator Removal Password Policy Discovery Indirect Command Execution Unsecured Credentials Peripheral Device Discove Permission Groups Disco Modify Authentication Process Process Discovery Modify Cloud Compute Infrastr Query Registry Modify Registry Modify System Image Software Discovery Network Boundary Bridging System Information Discover Obfuscated Files or Information System Location Discovery Plist File Modification System Network Configu Pre-OS Boot ess Injection System Owner/User Discovery Reflective Code Loading System Service Discovery Rogue Domain Controller System Time Discovery Rootkit Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion Subvert Trust Controls System Binary Proxy Execution Sustem Script Drovy Even

Discovery

32 techniqu

Bund your ATT&CK Layers

- Import them into navigator
- Add A+B+C etc
- Use the heatmap generated



DISABCIN IDEAS

- Understand what is likely left of boom
- Build comprehensive understanding of post-compromise pre-impact TTPs
- Increase confidence of CTI based prioritisations



ADVERSAR SIMULATION

- Build more completed profiles
- Build potential profiles to simulate
- Help create attack flows
- Import into tools like OpenBAS



THE STRANDEST

- Leverage TIE to enhance CTI
 - reporting
- Build profiles to simulate likely new
 - adversaries
- Enhance your resilience and feed into
 - the other great projects from MITRE



CHALLENG TITHT

- Uses ATT&CK V14
- Common techniques have been
 - renumbered so dataset
 - is..challenging
- You can't select appropriate
 - platforms
- Can't export from TIE>ATT&CK Flow



TIDING

- platforms

As community let s continibute

adversary knowledge • Let's use our Jedi powers for good • Join the defence alliance • MITRE, how can we continue to improve the model as a community? • MITRE: Let me select appropriate











My LinkedIn



MITRE ATT&CK Slack

US

LET'S NONDODUSS ARE AS KNOWLEDGEAB LE AS ALL OF